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ZONING ADULT BUSINESSES AFTER LOS ANGELES v. ALAMEDA 
BOOKS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As observed by the United States Supreme Court, the French author 
Voltaire eloquently illuminated the right of free speech provided to citizens of 
this country in one powerful statement, “I disapprove of what you say, but I 
will defend to the death your right to say it.”1  The ideal embodied by this 
sentiment is challenged aggressively in situations where a community has a 
significant interest in regulating unpopular speech.2  One example of such a 
situation is City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,3 which was recently 
presented to the United States Supreme Court.  In this case, the Court was 
asked to rule on the constitutionality of a city zoning ordinance regulating the 
location of adult entertainment businesses.  While the decision only received 
plurality support, the holding in Alameda is sound.  The plurality and 
concurring opinions, as will be shown, provide the appropriate rationale for 
determining whether a zoning ordinance is designed to serve a substantial 
government interest and is deemed to be constitutional. 
It is questionable whether some types of establishments, especially those 
that are adult-oriented, enjoy the First Amendment’s full protection.4  
Allegedly, a lesser extent of protection applies when city governments, acting 
within their zoning powers, inhibit the prosperity of these businesses by 
limiting their choice of location,5 hours,6 and modes of operation.7  City 
 
 1. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting S. TALLENTRYE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907)). 
 2. Z.J. Gifts D-2 L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1998).  The Z.J. 
Gifts court recognized that “governmental limitations which limit expressive interests strike ‘[a]t 
the heart of the First Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 
U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).  Dealing specifically with adult entertainment, Supreme Court Justice 
Stevens commented that “few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve 
the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.”  
Young, 427 U.S. at 70. 
 3. 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
 4. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).  Nude dancing can 
consist of “expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though [the 
Court] view[s] it as only marginally so.”  Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566. 
 5. See generally Young, 427 U.S. at 52; City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 
41 (1986). 
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governments are fully entitled to restrict the free use of land if the regulation is 
justified by “some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”8  
The rationale behind this proposition seems to be that “[t]he operation of an 
establishment like [an adult book store] may have a place in our society but 
like the proverbial pig, it can be regulated out of the parlor and off the lawn.”9  
Thus, in order to preserve the First Amendment protections of these adult 
establishments, it is important to maintain a balance between a city’s zoning 
power and a specific business’ right of free speech.10 
While regulations that limit speech based on its content “presumptively 
violate the First Amendment,”11 cities are not held to such a strict standard 
when they justify the regulation of adult establishments, not by the content of 
speech, but by the secondary effects the businesses generate.  As evidenced by 
numerous studies,12 the damage produced by these establishments is 
measurable,13 and the “law does not require a city to ignore these consequences 
if it uses its zoning power in a reasonable way to ameliorate them without 
suppressing speech.”14  Thus, when a city takes action and imposes a zoning 
regulation, one pivotal question is whether the ordinance is designed to serve 
the government’s asserted interest in combating negative secondary effects.15  
When considering the evidence on this issue, certain standards must be 
employed to determine whether the regulation passes constitutional muster.  
First established by the Supreme Court in 1986,16 those standards were 
recently reviewed in Alameda.  This article will introduce Alameda in Section 
II and will outline the relevant history that brought it before the United States 
Supreme Court in Section III.  Section IV will discuss and dissect the Supreme 
 
 6. See generally Mitchell v. Comm’n on Adult Entertainment Establishments of Delaware, 
10 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 7. See generally Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 8. Young, 427 U.S. at 74 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926)). 
 9. Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 137. 
 10. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002). 
 11. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986). 
 12. ERIC DAMIAN KELLY & CONNIE COOPER, “EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO 
KNOW ABOUT REGULATING SEX BUSINESSES. . .” 57-65 (2000).  A 1998 study from Denver, Colo. 
concluded that adult shops lowered property values, generated crime, and decreased the quality of 
life.  Id. at 57.  A 1986 Fort Worth, Tex. study found the adult businesses contributed “to 
neighborhood decline by increasing vice-related activities, such as prostitution, obscenity, 
violations, and public lewdness.”  Id. at 58.  A study performed in St. Paul, Minn. in 1978 found 
that the “the presence of adult entertainment establishments correlate[d] statistically with poor 
neighborhood condition.”  Id. at 62.  A 1990 Tucson, Ariz. study exemplified the unsanitary 
conditions of some adult businesses—findings that may prove useful as support for regulations.  
Id. at 63. 
 13. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. 
 16. See id. 
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Court opinions rendered in that case and will evaluate subsequent lower court 
decisions.  Based on prior precedent as well as the responses from lower 
courts, it is apparent the plurality opinion, as well as Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion, resolved the evidentiary issue correctly. 
II.  CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. ALAMEDA BOOKS, INC. 
Even though a balance has been reached, the boundary preventing the 
government from encroaching upon a business’ right of free speech is not 
clearly defined.  This ambiguity is exemplified in Alameda.  In 1977, the city 
of Los Angeles conducted a comprehensive study to assess how concentrations 
of adult businesses impacted their surrounding areas.17  The study “found a 
positive correlation between concentrations of adult businesses and increases 
in prostitution, robberies, assaults, and thefts.”18  It also noted “there was 
‘some basis to conclude’ that property values in the study areas increased to a 
lesser degree than in the control areas.”19 
Responding to this study in 1978, the city enacted Los Angeles Municipal 
Code § 12.70(C) which attempted to regulate the location of adult 
entertainment establishments.20  After the enactment of the ordinance however, 
it became evident that multiple adult enterprises were congregating in a single 
building.21  To prevent this effect, in 1983, the city amended section 12.70(C) 
to prohibit “the establishment or maintenance of more than one adult 
entertainment business in the same building, structure or portion thereof.”22  
Further, the definition of “adult entertainment business” was altered to include 
and distinguish between adult arcades, bookstores, cabarets, motels, theaters, 
massage parlors, and places for sexual encounter.23  According to the 
ordinance, each specified enterprise would “constitute a separate adult 
entertainment business even if operated in conjunction with another adult 
entertainment business at the same establishment.”24  In addition, each would 
 
 17. Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 18. Alameda, 222 F.3d at 720. 
 19. Id. at n.1.  With respect to property values however, the study concluded “the 
concentration of adult businesses was not the primary cause” of lesser appreciation of value.  Id. 
 20. Id.  This ordinance prohibited “the establishment, substantial enlargement, or transfer of 
ownership or control of an adult business establishment within 1,000 feet of another such 
business or within 500 feet of any religious institution, school, or public park.”  Id. (citing 
L.A.M.C. § 12.70(C) (1977).  The constitutionality of this first regulation has not been 
challenged, and the Court assumed it was valid.  City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 
535 U.S. 425, 452 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 21. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 431. 
 22. Id. (quoting L.A.M.C. § 12.70 (1983)). 
 23. Id. (citing L.A.M.C. § 12.70(B)(17)). 
 24. Id. (quoting L.A.M.C. § 12.70(B)(17)). 
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be held individually accountable for obeying the locational restrictions outlined 
therein.25 
Both Alameda Books, Inc. (“Alameda”) and Highland Books, Inc. 
(“Highland”) operated “retail sales and rental operations in the same 
commercial space in which [their] video booths [were] located”26 and were 
concededly violating section 12.70(C) of the amended city code.27  Alameda 
and Highland joined together, suing “for declaratory and injunctive relief to 
prevent enforcement of the ordinance,” which allegedly violated their First 
Amendment rights.28 
The district court for the Central District of California granted Alameda’s 
and Highland’s motion for summary judgment and “issued a permanent 
injunction enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance against [them].”29  The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed because it determined that the 
“city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to 
demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments [was] ‘designed 
to serve’ the city’s substantial interest in reducing crime.”30  The Ninth Circuit 
held that because the city did not satisfy the test used to judge the validity of an 
adult entertainment regulation justified by secondary effects,31 the ordinance 
was accordingly invalid.32  The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari33 “to clarify the standard for determining whether an ordinance 
serves a substantial government interest,” and ultimately reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision.34 
III.  PRECEDENT NECESSITATING SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
To understand the underlying problem presented in Alameda, whether a 
zoning ordinance is designed to serve a substantial government interest, it is 
essential to review prior decisions that both give rise to the inquiry as well as 
call for its resolution.  Of particular importance are the United States Supreme 
Court cases that codified the standards for review when dealing with an adult 
 
 25. See id. 
 26. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 432. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 433. 
 30. Id.  “The Court of Appeals found that the 1977 study did not reasonably support the 
inference that a concentration of adult operations within a single adult establishment produced 
greater levels of criminal activity because the study focused on the effect that a concentration of 
establishments—not a concentration of operations within a single establishment—had on crime 
rates.”  Alameda, 535 U.S. at 436. 
 31. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 32. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 433. 
 33. 532 U.S. 902 (2001). 
 34. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 433. 
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entertainment establishment’s challenge to its city’s zoning ordinance.  These 
cases are discussed in Section A.  Additionally, the differing interpretations of 
such standards among the circuit courts, analyzed in Section B, illuminate 
relevant considerations that necessitated Supreme Court guidance.  Finally, 
Section C explores the history of Alameda. 
A. Supreme Court Foundation 
As recognized by one commentator, what is now known as the “secondary 
effects” doctrine originated as a footnote35 in Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, Inc.36  The ordinance at issue in that case prohibited adult motion 
picture theaters and book stores from being located within 1,000 feet of any 
two other such establishments or within 500 feet of a residential area.37  Those 
supporting the ordinance emphasized that a concentration of such businesses 
tended to “attract an undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely 
affect[ed] property values, cause[d] an increase in crime, especially 
prostitution, and encourage[d] residents and businesses to move elsewhere.”38  
Two adult motion picture operators that were located in violation of the 
ordinance brought suit. 
Alleging the ordinance would prohibit some theaters from exhibiting films 
protected by the First Amendment, the motion picture operators argued that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional.39  A majority of the Court found the 1,000-foot 
restriction imposed on the adult motion picture theaters did not “create an 
impermissible restraint on protected communication” even though the theaters 
were required to “satisfy a locational restriction not applicable to other 
theaters.”40  It then held that apart from the dissimilar treatment of certain 
theaters, as well as “the fact that the classification [was] predicated on the 
content of material shown in the respective theaters, the regulation of the place 
where such films may be exhibited [did] not offend the First Amendment.”41  
The Court further stressed, “[r]easonable regulations of the time, place, and 
manner of protected speech, where those regulations are necessary to further 
significant governmental interests, [were] permitted by the First 
Amendment.”42  Disappointingly though, although the Court reached a 
conclusion, it divided over the appropriate rationale. 
 
 35. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: “The Evisceration of First 
Amendment Freedoms,” 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 61 (1997). 
 36. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 37. Id. at 52.  Adopted in 1972, this ordinance was, among others, an amendment to 
Detroit’s “Anti-Skid Row Ordinance” that had been initiated ten years earlier.  Id. at 54. 
 38. Id. at 55. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Young, 427 U.S. at 62. 
 41. Id. at 63. 
 42. Id. at 63 n.18. 
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The plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens focused on “the need for 
absolute neutrality by the government; its regulation of communication may 
not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being expressed 
by the communicator.”43  That said, Justice Stevens was quick to point out that 
“a line may be drawn on the basis of content without violating the 
government’s paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected 
communication.”44  The remaining question therefore, was whether the line 
could be “justified by the city’s interest in preserving the character of its 
neighborhoods,”45 an interest that “must be accorded high respect.”46  Turning 
to the facts, Justice Stevens found that through police department memoranda 
and findings made by the city’s common council,47 the city had shown that the 
increase in criminal activity and area deterioration was caused by 
concentrations of adult movie theaters and not by those showing other types of 
films.48  Thus, it was evident that it was the “secondary effect which the zoning 
ordinances attempt[ed] to avoid, not the dissemination of ‘offensive’ speech.”49  
Falling under such a classification, Justice Stevens concluded the zoning 
ordinance was constitutional.50 
Building on the principles established in Young, the Court in City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,51 went a step further to develop a 
constitutional test of validity.  In that case, the Mayor of Renton advised the 
city council to enact zoning legislation to deal with adult entertainment 
establishments.52  As a result, the Planning and Development Committee “held 
public hearings, reviewed the experiences of . . . other cities, and received a 
report from the City Attorney’s Office advising as to developments in other 
 
 43. Id. at 67. 
 44. Id. at 70.  The “regulation of the places where sexually explicit films may be exhibited is 
unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical message a film may be intended to 
communicate; whether a motion picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another, 
the effect of the ordinances is exactly the same.”  Young, 427 U.S. at 70. 
 45. Id. at 71. 
 46. Id.  “Moreover, the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with 
solutions to admittedly serious problems.”  Id. 
 47. Id. at 55 n.8.  “[T]he Detroit Common Council made a finding that some uses of property 
are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are concentrated in limited areas.”  Young, 
427 U.S. at 54. 
 48. Id. at 71 n.34. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 72-73.  “Since what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a limitation on the 
place where adult films may be exhibited, even though the determination of whether a particular 
film fits that characterization turns on the nature of its content, [Justice Stevens concluded] that 
the city’s interest in the present and future character of its neighborhoods adequately supports its 
classification of motion pictures.”  Id. at 72. 
 51. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 52. Renton, 475 U.S. at 44. 
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cities.”53  Acting on the Committee’s recommendation, the City Council 
enacted an ordinance prohibiting any adult motion picture theater “from 
locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family 
dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school.”54  The owner of 
two theaters located in violation of the ordinance challenged its 
constitutionality.55 
In Renton, the Court outlined a three-prong test which must be satisfied in 
order for a zoning ordinance of this sort to be considered constitutionally valid.  
Finding authority from Justice Stevens in Young, the Court stated the first step 
was to determine whether the ordinance could be analyzed as a “time, place, 
and manner regulation.”56  The ordinances in Young and Renton were similar 
and could both be so characterized because they restricted the possible 
locations within which adult businesses could operate instead of prohibiting 
them completely.57 
Following close behind was the second query: whether the ordinance was 
content-based or content-neutral.58  This determination was significant because 
each classification applied a different standard to establish constitutionality.  
For example, “regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the 
basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.”59  
Alternatively, content-neutral regulations are “acceptable so long as they are 
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably 
limit alternative avenues of communication.”60  In Renton, the Court deferred 
to the lower court’s finding that the City Council’s “predominate concerns” 
were with the secondary effects of theaters housing such adult films.61  It 
 
 53. Id. While discussions were taking place, the City Council imposed a moratorium on the 
licensing of sexually explicit businesses, explaining that such businesses would severely impact 
neighboring communities.  Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 45. 
 56. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 46-47. 
 59. Id.  When a regulation “focuses only on the content of the speech and the direct impact 
that speech has on its listeners,” the regulation is labeled content based.  United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-812 (2000) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 
(1988) (emphasis in original)).  Analyzing the regulation under strict scrutiny, “it must be 
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”  Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 
529 U.S. at 813.  Thus, if there is a “less restrictive alternative [that] would serve the 
Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”  Id. “To do otherwise would be 
to restrict speech without an adequate justification, a course the First Amendment does not 
permit.”  Id. 
 60. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. 
 61. Id.  In finding the Renton ordinance to be content-neutral, the Court stressed that instead 
of being designed to “suppress the expression of unpopular views,” the ordinance was designed to 
combat negative secondary effects associated with adult establishments.  Id. at 48.  “If [the city] 
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concluded, “zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary 
effects of [adult entertainment] businesses [were] to be reviewed under the 
standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner 
regulations.”62 
After an ordinance is deemed to be content-neutral, the Court must still 
consider Renton’s third step: whether the ordinance “is designed to serve a 
substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues 
of communication.”63  In determining whether an ordinance is designed to 
serve a substantial interest, courts must keep in mind that the 
First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to 
conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated 
by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably 
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.64 
The Renton Court also recognized it must show deference to the city’s choices 
for combating negative externalities, stating it was not the Court’s “function to 
appraise the wisdom of [the city’s] decision to require adult theaters to be 
separated rather than concentrated in the same areas.”65  Thus, because the 
secondary effects associated with concentrations of adult businesses are 
“admittedly [a] serious problem,” the “city must be allowed a reasonable 
opportunity to experiment with solutions.”66 
Even when the regulations are connected to a substantial government 
interest, the final task is to determine whether the ordinance leaves open 
alternative avenues of communication for the adult entertainment business.67  
Identifying alternative avenues, the Court in Renton stressed that there was no 
First Amendment violation when adult businesses were placed on an equal 
footing with other prospective purchasers or lessees of real estate.68  The Court 
expressly stated, “the First Amendment requires only that [the city] refrain 
from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and 
operate an adult theater within the city.”69 
 
had been concerned with restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to 
close them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to location.” Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 62. Renton, 475 U.S. at 49. 
 63. Id. at 50. 
 64. Id. at 51-52. 
 65. Id. at 52 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion)) (alteration in original). 
 66. Id. (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion)). 
 67. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. 
 68. Id. at 54.  The Court was quick to note that it had “never suggested that the First 
Amendment [compelled] the Government to ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of 
speech-related businesses for that matter, [would] be able to obtain sites at bargain prices.”  Id. 
 69. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] ZONING ADULT BUSINESSES AFTER LOS ANGELES v. ALAMEDA BOOKS 1125 
Turning to the facts before it, the Renton Court concluded that the city had 
validly responded to the “admittedly serious problems” associated with adult 
businesses and had not used “the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing 
expression.”70  The zoning ordinance was therefore constitutional.71  Although 
its ultimate decision was important, it was the three-part test set out in Renton 
that cemented the guidelines for lower courts to follow. 
Five years after Renton was decided, the Supreme Court issued a plurality 
decision upholding a zoning ordinance that regulated nude dancing in Barnes 
v. Glen Theatre, Inc.72  Of significance to this discussion is Justice Souter’s 
concurring opinion, in which he commented on the applicability of the Renton 
test.73  Justice Souter noted that in Renton, the city “was not compelled to 
justify its restrictions by studies specifically relating to the problems that 
would be caused by adult theaters in that city.”74  As a result, a city could rely 
on the experiences of other cities demonstrating a correlation between 
secondary effects and one adult theater.75  Justice Souter then found 
similarities between the regulated activities in Barnes with those in Renton and 
commented that it was “no leap to say that live nude dancing . . . [was] likely 
to produce the same pernicious secondary effects as [] adult films. . . .”76  
Therefore, in light of Renton,77 the State “could reasonably conclude that 
forbidding nude entertainment” furthered its interests in preventing 
prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes.78 
Shortly before Alameda reached the Supreme Court, another nude dancing 
case, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,79 helped shed light on Renton’s standards.  
 
 70. Id. (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 84 (Powell J., concurring)). 
 71. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55.  The city had preserved the quality of life in its communities 
while “satisfying the dictates of the First Amendment.”  Id. 
 72. 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion) (applying the slightly different intermediate 
scrutiny test from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The O’Brien test includes four 
factors: 1) “whether the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the 
government to enact;” 2) “whether the regulation furthers an important or substantial government 
interest;” 3) “that the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;” and 
4) “that the restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government 
interest.”  City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296, 301 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 73. The second prong of the O’Brien test asks “whether the regulation furthers an important 
or substantial governmental interest,” which is sufficiently similar to Renton’s prong requiring 
that the ordinance be designed to serve a substantial government interest.  See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 
583 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 583-84. 
 75. Id. at 584. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  Renton recognized that “legislation seeking to combat the secondary effects of adult 
entertainment need not await localized proof of [secondary] effects.”  Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584. 
 78. Id.  A state is not required to “affirmatively [] undertake to litigate this issue repeatedly 
in every case.”  Id. at 584-85 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 79. 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
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Unfortunately however, the decision only received plurality support.  Deciding 
whether the challenged regulation furthered a substantial government 
interest,80 Justice O’Connor noted that with regulations that “strike [close] to 
the core of First Amendment values,” a “local government’s reasonable belief 
that the experience of other jurisdictions [was] relevant to the problem it [was] 
addressing” was sufficient.81  The record revealed however, that the city of 
Erie did more than simply rely on the findings of other cities; it also relied on 
its own to justify its regulation.82  The record also demonstrated the adult 
business “had ample opportunity to contest the council’s findings about 
secondary effects,” but it never challenged those findings or cast any specific 
doubt on their validity.83  Consequently, the plurality concluded that “[i]n the 
absence of any reason to doubt it, the city’s expert judgment should be 
credited.”84 
B. Conflicting Interpretations by the Circuit Courts 
The test outlined in Renton appeared to be straightforward in judging 
whether a city intruded upon an adult business’ First Amendment rights.  But 
when applied in different scenarios, the standard grew susceptible to 
conflicting interpretations and, as one commentator pointed out, has been 
inconsistently employed.85  One prevalent dispute among the circuits 
concerned the third part of Renton’s test: the extent of evidence considered 
sufficient to justify reliance by a city and support a reasonable belief that the 
ordinance targeted secondary effects.  The viewpoints held by the circuits on 
this issue tended to be similar, with one exception.  The Ninth Circuit, which 
decided Alameda, proved to be the divergent Circuit.  As will be shown, given 
the state of disagreement between the circuits, it was critical for the Supreme 
Court to resolve this issue in a concrete fashion. 
The challenged bill in Mitchell v. Commission on Adult Entertainment 
Establishments of Delaware,86 a Third Circuit case, limited the hours during 
 
 80. As did the Court in Barnes, the Court in Pap’s A.M. used the O’Brien test.  See Pap’s 
A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-301. 
 81. Id. at 297. 
 82. Id.  In fact, Erie’s City Council found on various occasions spanning over one hundred 
years that “certain lewd, immoral activities carried on in public places for profit . . . promote 
violence, public intoxication, prostitution and other serious criminal activity.”  Id. 
 83. Id. at 298.  The only complaint raised was a simple assertion that evidentiary proof was 
lacking.  Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 298. 
 84. Id. at 297. 
 85. David Wolfson, Case Note: City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 4 J.L. & FAM. 
STUD. 191, 197 (2002). 
 86. 10 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1993). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] ZONING ADULT BUSINESSES AFTER LOS ANGELES v. ALAMEDA BOOKS 1127 
which adult entertainment businesses could operate.87  The bill was challenged 
by respondents alleging that, before enactment, there was insufficient evidence 
of the secondary effects of adult businesses to support the regulation.88  The 
court in Mitchell cited Renton to support its position that the omission of such 
evidence was not determinative on the regulation’s invalidity.  It noted, “a city 
or state may rely heavily on the experience of, and studies produced by, other 
cities and states, as well as on court opinions from other jurisdictions.”89  The 
Mitchell court stressed however, that the city must rely on such evidence to 
justify the regulations. 90  Taking into account the findings from other cities as 
well as the support garnered before passage of the bill, it concluded the city 
had a substantial government interest in regulating the hours of adult 
businesses.91 
The court in Mitchell then recognized that even after determining the 
existence of a substantial government interest, it still had to address whether 
the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.92  Interpreting 
Renton, the court stated this requirement left “a legislative body free to classify 
and draw lines, provided it [did] not wholly or practically prevent access to the 
expressive material whose sale and distribution the ordinance or statute 
incidentally regulate[d].”93  Under such a perspective, instead of proving a 
particular adult business must be restricted to prevent undesirable secondary 
effects, the city needed only to “show that adult entertainment establishments 
as a class cause the unwanted secondary effects the statute regulates.”94  Under 
such a definition, the restrictions in this case met the standards of Renton. 
 
 87. Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 127.  The establishment offered adult film and “video presentations 
for viewing from within completely enclosed booths.  It also provided enclosed booths for 
viewing live entertainment.”  Id. at 127-28. 
 88. Id. at 133. There was no sworn testimony supporting its amendments, no public hearings 
had been conducted, nor had the city conducted an official study to determine whether the 
operating hours of an establishment affected the welfare of surrounding neighborhoods.  Id.  This 
is not to say the bill was passed for no reason. “As pre-enactment evidence, the Senate had before 
it a synopsis of the [b]ill and a statement by its chief sponsor.”  Id. at 134.  The district court 
deemed this to be sufficient support to satisfy the test outlined in Renton.  Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 
134. 
 89. Id. at 133. 
 90. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 91. Id. at 137. 
 92. Id.  “Whether the asserted government interest is proper and adequately supported is 
usually analyzed in terms of whether the enactment is narrowly tailored to achieve this interest[.]”  
Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 133. 
 93. Id. at 138.  The Mitchell court understood Renton to mean that a state legislature did “not 
need to survey every adult book store in the state to determine the effect the statute or regulation 
[would] have on each.”  Id. 
 94. Id. (emphasis added). 
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According to the Eighth Circuit in ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of 
Rochester,95 it was obvious that regulations that are “reasonably designed to 
curb unwanted secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses serve a 
substantial governmental interest.”96  In this case, when enacting its regulation 
restricting the location of adult businesses, the city relied upon studies 
conducted by other cities.97  The ILQ court recognized that this practice was 
clearly allowed by Renton.98  But, respondents argued that the city should be 
“constitutionally required to disregard these studies” because they “did not 
specifically address businesses similar to [those owned by ILQ] . . . adult 
bookstores ‘that offer both sexually explicit and non-sexually explicit material 
and allow only off-premises consumption of those materials.’”99  The ILQ 
court responded that such a view was “simply not the law.”100  It reiterated that 
a “city may rely upon studies or evidence generated by other cities ‘so long as 
[that] evidence [was] reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the 
city addresse[d].’”101  Thus, the court in ILQ did not require the city to prove 
that specific adult establishments would likely have the exact same adverse 
effects on their surroundings as did the adult businesses studied in other 
cities.102 
The challenged ordinance before the Tenth Circuit in Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. 
v. City of Aurora,103 was very similar to the locational zoning regulation at 
issue in ILQ.104  The adult establishment challenging the ordinance did not 
provide any on-site adult entertainment such as nude dancing or peep shows, 
but instead only sold and rented material to customers for off-premises 
viewing.105  The court in Z.J. Gifts overcame a quick obstacle after stating this 
ordinance could be analyzed under either the Renton or O’Brien standards,106 
because there was little difference between them.107 
 
 95. 25 F.3d 1413 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 96. ILQ Inv., Inc., 25 F.3d at 1416. 
 97. Id. at 1416-1417. 
 98. Id. at 1416. 
 99. Id. at 1417-1418.  The studies focused on the secondary effects of adult businesses 
generally.  Id. 
 100. ILQ Inv., Inc., 25 F.3d at 1418. 
 101. Id. at 1416 (first alteration in original) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)). 
 102. Id. at 1418. 
 103. 136 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 104. Specifically, the Z.J. Gifts’ ordinance “required sexually oriented businesses to locate in 
industrially-zoned areas, and prohibited them from locating within 1500 feet of churches, schools, 
residential districts or dwellings, public parks, and other sexually oriented businesses.”  Z.J. Gifts, 
136 F.3d at 685. 
 105. Id. at 685. 
 106. See id. at 688. 
 107. Id. at 688. 
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Turning to the facts, the Z.J. Gifts court noted that the city had enacted its 
ordinance after deliberating, holding public hearings, and reviewing “a 
thorough legislative record.”108  The adult business argued that this evidence 
failed to demonstrate “that the recited harms [were] real, not merely 
conjectural . . .”109  The court disagreed and stressed a city “need not wait for 
sexually oriented businesses to locate within its boundaries, depress property 
values, increase crime, and spread sexually transmitted diseases before it 
regulates those businesses. . . .  In other words, the city may control a 
perceived risk through regulation.”110  The court emphasized that “Renton’s 
constitutional framework [granted] the city broad discretion to choose the 
means and scope of its regulation of sexually oriented businesses.”111 
The Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to apply the Renton test to a zoning 
ordinance challenge in Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County.112  The ordinance 
in that case prohibited location of adult-oriented businesses “within 1000 feet 
of any residential land use; place of worship; funeral home; school, park or 
playground; or ‘any other recreational facility or other area where large 
numbers of minors regularly travel or congregate.’”113  Although it did not find 
fault with the county’s “substantial interest in preventing the deleterious 
secondary effects often associated with adult theaters,”114 for the ordinance to 
be valid, the court required a “logical relationship between the evil feared and 
the method selected to combat it.”115  This meant that, in enacting certain 
restrictions against adult businesses, the city had to show that “it relied upon 
evidence permitting the reasonable inference that, absent such limitations, the 
adult theaters would have harmful secondary effects.”116  According to the 
Tollis court, the county failed to present evidence that “a single showing of an 
adult movie would have any harmful secondary effects on the community.”117  
Therefore, the court concluded that the ordinance failed to satisfy the third 
prong of Renton’s test,118 and the injunction against enforcing the ordinance 
was proper.119 
 
 108. Id. at 685. 
 109. Z.J. Gifts, 136 F.3d at 688 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 664 (1994)). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 689. 
 112. 827 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 113. Tollis, 827 F.2d at 1331. 
 114. Id. at 1332. 
 115. Id. at 1332-33. 
 116. Id. at 1333. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Tollis, 827 F.2d at 1332. 
 119. Id. at 1333. 
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Another Ninth Circuit case, Colacurcio v. City of Kent,120 was decided 
along the same lines as Tollis.  After examining issues related to adult 
entertainment, the city’s planning department published a study concerning the 
effects of adult entertainment on surrounding communities.121  Soon afterward, 
the city enacted an ordinance prohibiting, among other things, performers in 
adult establishments from dancing within ten feet of patrons.122 
The respondent contended there were less burdensome alternatives than the 
ten-foot requirement, so the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve the 
city’s interests.123  The court disagreed and specified that the alleged 
alternatives, a one-foot distance requirement and a “no-touch” rule, were not 
reasonable “as they would not serve the city’s purposes of controlling drug 
transactions and prostitution.”124  The Colacurcio court held that the adult 
business “failed to present evidence showing that a ten-foot rule burden[ed] 
substantially more expression than necessary to achieve its purpose.”125  
Accordingly, the ordinance was considered to be narrowly tailored to achieve 
the city’s objective in combating secondary effects.126 
C. Alameda Before the Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit, in Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,127 zeroed 
in on the discreet issue of whether a regulation is “designed to serve” a 
government’s substantial interest in reducing crime, which it defined to be 
Colacurcio’s second step.128  The court first decided that the evidence Los 
Angeles had relied upon to justify its amendments was insufficient to show 
that the regulation was designed to serve the city’s interest in reducing the 
 
 120. 163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 121. Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 548.  The study also included a “discussion of various regulatory 
alternatives.”  Id. 
 122. Id. at 549.  After reviewing the city’s own study as well as affidavits and statements 
from police officers and vice detectives, the court found the ordinance was content neutral and 
proceeded to the narrow tailoring requirement.  Id. at 553. 
 123. Id.  This case was decided using the O’Brien standards.  Id. at 551. 
 124. Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 554.  The proposed alternatives would “fail to provide sufficient 
line-of-vision for law enforcement personnel” and would still allow “verbal communication 
between dancers and patrons, thereby failing to curtail propositions for drugs or sex.”  Id. 
 125. Id. at 554. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 128. Id. at 723-24.  The test outlined in Colacurcio allowed a city to “impose reasonable 
restrictions on the time, place or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions [were]: (1) 
content-neutral; (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest; and (3) [left] 
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”  Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 
551 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).  The Ninth Circuit did 
specify that there was “no substantive difference” between the standard tests in Tollis and 
Colacurcio.  Alameda, 222 F.3d at 722-23. 
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secondary effects generated by adult businesses.129  The study did not “analyze 
an individual bookstore/arcade combination as a concentration of adult 
businesses[,]” and therefore “did not identify any harmful secondary effects 
resulting from [such establishments] as individual business units.”130  Thus, it 
was “unreasonable for the [c]ity to infer that absent its regulations, a 
bookstore/arcade combination would have harmful secondary effects.”131  The 
Ninth Circuit also noted that although a city may rely on foreign studies, it was 
still obligated to demonstrate that its own study is reasonably believed to be 
relevant to the addressed problem.132 
These circuit court cases exhibit the subtle problem encountered when 
interpreting the test outlined in Renton.  The Ninth Circuit seemed clearly at 
odds with the other circuits in imposing a higher burden on the government to 
prove a connection between its regulation of adult establishments and its 
substantial interest in combating secondary effects.  Given this disagreement, it 
was important for the Supreme Court to rule on the issue and define the 
appropriate evidentiary burden.  Thus by taking Alameda, the United States 
Supreme Court agreed to analyze the disagreement and “clarify the standard 
for determining whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest 
under Renton.”133 
IV.  SUPREME COURT’S FRACTURED RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT 
CONFUSION 
Following Renton, courts used its three-part test as a safeguard to ensure 
that government zoning ordinances regulating adult businesses did not infringe 
on the First Amendment rights of those businesses.  As shown through the 
circuit court opinions, however, there were conflicting interpretations of 
Renton’s standards.  The Supreme Court responded in an attempt to dispel the 
confusion, but did so in a fractured decision.  Section A discusses the opinions 
given in Alameda, penned by Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice 
Souter, respectively.  Section B analyzes these opinions and determines that 
the most fitting rationale would be a combination of the opinions written by 
Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy.  Section C looks at lower court 
decisions rendered after Alameda to discover how the circuit courts are 
responding to the Supreme Court decision. 
 
 129. Id. at 724. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 725. 
 132. Id. at 726. 
 133. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 433 (2002). 
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A. Discussion of Zoning Ordinance Rationales 
1. Justice O’Connor’s Plurality Opinion Deferred to the City’s 
Justification. 
The plurality opinion in Alameda was written by Justice O’Connor and 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, and Justice Scalia.134  
Recognizing the consequences a clear decision in this case would impose, 
Justice O’Connor began by noting the Court must carefully balance competing 
interests.135  It must “exercise independent judgment when First Amendment 
rights are implicated,” but also acknowledge that a particular city “is in a better 
position than the Judiciary to gather and evaluate data on local problems.”136 
Applying the Renton standard in Alameda, Justice O’Connor established 
the point at which evidence supporting a zoning ordinance must be introduced 
in order to satisfy Renton’s third prong.137  “[T]he inquiry into whether [the 
ordinance was] ‘designed to serve a substantial government interest and [did] 
not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication’” began with 
verification that the ‘predominate concerns’ behind the ordinance were the 
secondary effects of speech.138  The analysis continued with the plurality 
asking “whether the municipality [could] demonstrate a connection between 
the speech regulated by the ordinance and the secondary effects that motivated 
the adoption of the ordinance.”139  For the plurality in Alameda, evidence 
would only be required to satisfy the latter inquiry.140  The extent of evidence 
sufficient to establish a correlation was the next question to resolve. 
To demonstrate a connection between speech and a government interest, 
Justice O’Connor followed Renton and asserted that the city may rely on any 
evidence that is “reasonably believed to be relevant” to show a correlation.141  
 
 134. Although he thought the plurality correctly applied Renton’s test in the Alameda case, 
Justice Scalia also wrote separately.  Drawing on his earlier opinions in Pap’s A.M. and FW/PBS, 
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), Justice Scalia reasserted his view that the “secondary 
effects” rationale in the regulation of pornographic speech was completely unnecessary.  Id. at 
443 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment); FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 256-61 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)).  He held strongly to the notion that the “Constitution does not prevent those 
communities that wish to do so from regulating, or indeed entirely suppressing, the business of 
pandering sex.”  Alameda, 535 at 443-44 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 135. Id. at 440. 
 136. Id. (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666, 665-66 
(1978)). 
 137. Id. at 440. 
 138. Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted). 
 139. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 441. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 438 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)).  
In Renton, the Court held that a city, in enacting an adult business zoning ordinance, was allowed 
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She was also quick to point out that this did not mean that “a municipality 
[could] get away with shoddy data or reasoning,” but only that the evidence 
must “fairly support the municipality’s rationale for its ordinance.”142  Justice 
O’Connor then proposed a useful balancing test: 
If plaintiffs fail to cast direct doubt on [the secondary effects] rationale, either 
by demonstrating that the municipality’s evidence does not support its 
rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality’s factual 
findings, the municipality meets the standard set forth in Renton.  If plaintiffs 
succeed in casting doubt on a municipality’s rationale in either manner, the 
burden shifts back to the municipality to supplement the record with evidence 
renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.143 
Looking to the facts of the case, Justice O’Connor identified the central 
piece of evidence at issue in Alameda as the city’s 1977 study, which included 
a report on city crime patterns provided by the Los Angeles Police 
Department.144  The Court of Appeals had faulted the 1977 study for focusing 
on “the effect that a concentration of establishments—not a concentration of 
operations within a single establishment—had on crime rates.”145  The 
Alameda plurality responded that the Ninth Circuit “misunderstood the 
implications of the 1977 study.”146  Justice O’Connor found that it was both 
consistent with the 1977 study and reasonable for Los Angeles “to suppose that 
a concentration of adult establishments [was] correlated with high crime rates 
because a concentration of operations in one locale draws, for example, a 
greater concentration of adult consumers to the neighborhood, and a high 
density of such consumers either attracts or generates criminal activity.”147  
The plurality in Alameda then concluded that it was “rational for the city to 
infer that reducing the concentration of adult operations in a neighborhood, 
whether within separate establishments or in one large establishment, [would] 
reduce crime rates.”148 
 
to rely on experiences of other cities as well as findings of other courts.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 51.  
As long as the evidence relied upon is “reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the 
city addresses,” the method chosen by the city to further its interests would receive deference.  Id. 
at 51-52.  “The city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to 
admittedly serious problems.”  Id. at 52 (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion)). 
 142. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 438. 
 143. Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted). 
 144. Id. at 435. 
 145. Id. at 436. “The Court of Appeals pointed out that the study treated combination adult 
bookstore/arcades as single establishments and did not study the effect of any separate-standing 
adult bookstore or arcade.”  Id. 
 146. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 436. 
 147. Id.  The underlying assumption is that multiple adult businesses in one establishment 
draws the same traffic as multiple establishments in close proximity to each other.  Therefore, it is 
very similar to mini-malls and department stores which attract crowds of consumers.  Id. 
 148. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 439. 
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Addressing the type of evidence necessary for Los Angeles to show that its 
ordinance successfully decreased secondary effects, Justice O’Connor 
specified that empirical evidence was not required.149  The Court had “never 
required that municipalities make such a showing, certainly not without actual 
and convincing evidence from plaintiffs to the contrary.”150  This was 
especially true in this case where neither establishment “provide[d] any reason 
to question the city’s theory.”151 
While the city certainly bears the burden of providing evidence that supports a 
link between concentrations of adult operations and asserted secondary effects, 
it does not bear the burden of providing evidence that rules out every theory 
for the link between concentrations of adult establishments that is inconsistent 
with its own.152 
Imposing an empirical evidence requirement “would go too far in undermining 
[the] settled position that municipalities must be given a ‘reasonable 
opportunity to experiment with solutions’ to address the secondary effects of 
protected speech.”153  Thus, for Justice O’Connor, instead of requiring 
empirical evidence to prove a correlation between the regulated speech and 
secondary effects, only a reasonable belief of such a connection was 
necessary.154  The Alameda plurality concluded that the 1977 study conducted 
by Los Angeles was sufficient to support a reasonable belief by the city that 
the regulation would further its interest in combating negative secondary 
effects, and accordingly, it met Renton’s third prong. 
2. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence Considered the Effect on Speech. 
Justice Kennedy’s agreement with the plurality that Los Angeles could 
reasonably rely on its 1977 study to justify regulation of the adult 
establishments in question secured a majority decision in this case.  His 
 
 149. See id.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 437.  “In particular, they do not offer a competing theory, let alone data, that 
explains why the elevated crime rates in neighborhoods with a concentration of adult 
establishments can be attributed entirely to the presence of permanent walls between, and 
separate entrances to, each individual adult operation.”  Id. 
 152. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 437. 
 153. Id. at 439 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)). 
 154. Id. at 430, 442.  Justice O’Connor gave an example of a city considering an innovative 
solution, such as the  Los Angeles ordinance in this case, which regulated multiple-use adult 
establishments.  Id. at 430-40.  The city might “not have data that could demonstrate the efficacy 
of its proposal because the solution would, by definition, not have been implemented previously.”  
Id.  Allegedly, there were no adult video arcades that operated independently of adult bookstores.  
Alameda, 535 U.S. at 440.  Thus, there would be no treatment group with which to compare a 
control group of adult establishments.  Id.  If the ordinance would be struck down accordingly for 
lack of such an empirical comparison, the city would be without the “means to address the 
secondary effects with which it is concerned.”  Id. at 440. 
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separate opinion, however, provided a rationale divergent from that of Justice 
O’Connor.  For Justice Kennedy, the question presented in this case was 
“whether the ordinance at issue [was] invalid ‘because the city did not study 
the negative effects of such combinations of adult businesses, but rather relied 
on judicially approved statutory precedent from other jurisdictions.’”155  He 
answered this question by splitting it into two separate inquiries: what 
proposition must be advanced to sustain a secondary-effects ordinance and 
what is the extent of evidence required to support the proposition?156 
In the answer to the first of his two questions, Justice Kennedy began by 
showing respect to city governments that know that “high concentrations of 
adult businesses can damage the value and the integrity of a neighborhood.  
The damage is measurable; it is all too real.”157  Accordingly, the “law [did] 
not require a city to ignore these consequences if it uses its zoning power in a 
reasonable way to ameliorate them without suppressing speech.”158  With these 
ideas in mind, Justice Kennedy asserted that the “rationale of the ordinance 
must be that it will suppress secondary effects—and not by suppressing 
speech.”159  Therefore, the premise behind the ordinance must be that the 
ordinance “will cause two businesses to split rather than one to close, that the 
quantity of speech will be substantially undiminished, and that total secondary 
effects will be significantly reduced.”160 
The remaining question for Justice Kennedy was whether there was 
sufficient evidence in this case to support such a rationale.  Because the Los 
Angeles City Council knew the streets of Los Angeles better than the Court, 
the City Council was “entitled to rely on that knowledge; and if its inferences 
appear[ed] reasonable, [the Court] should not say there [was] no basis for its 
conclusion.”161  Justice Kennedy noted that after finding “a correlation 
between the concentration of adult establishments and crime” as a result of its 
own study, the city of Los Angeles “sought to disperse these businesses.”162  
The Court would be allowed to posit that a “dispersal ordinance would cause a 
 
 155. Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Pet. for Cert. i ). 
 156. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 157. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 449-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “It is no trick to reduce secondary effects by 
reducing speech or its audience; but a city may not attack secondary effects indirectly by 
attacking speech.”  Id. at 450. 
 160. Id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “If two adult businesses are under the same roof, 
an ordinance requiring them to separate will have one of two results: One business will either 
move elsewhere or close.  The city’s premise cannot be the latter.”  Alameda, 535 U.S. at 450-51. 
 161. Id. at 451-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 162. Id. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “Two or more adult businesses in close proximity 
seem[ed] to attract a critical mass of unsavory characters and the crime rate may increase as a 
result.”  Id. 
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great reduction in secondary effects at very small cost to speech.”163  As a 
result, the remaining step to justify the ordinance was to permit the city to 
“infer—from its study and from its own experience—that two adult businesses 
under the same roof [were] no better than two next door.”164  Thus, Justice 
Kennedy agreed with the plurality in concluding that the Los Angeles 
regulation was reasonably likely to reduce negative secondary effects 
associated with adult establishments.165 
3. Justice Souter’s Dissent Argued that the Evidence was Insufficient. 
Justice Souter, along with Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice 
Breyer, concluded that Los Angeles had failed to demonstrate a sufficient 
connection between its amended zoning ordinance and its interest in crime 
control.166 
Justice Souter focused on the empirical nature of the evidence necessary to 
support a secondary effects zoning ordinance.167  He began by attacking the 
city’s 1977 study itself, stating it was unsuccessful in confirming an 
“association between higher crime rates and any isolated adult 
establishments.”168  According to Justice Souter, the city reviewed its study 
and simply assumed “a bookstore selling videos and providing viewing booths 
produce[d] secondary effects of crime, and more crime than would result from 
having a single store without booths in one part of town and a video arcade in 
another.”169  This assumption was faulty because the city offered no evidence 
to support “even the simple proposition that an otherwise lawfully located 
adult bookstore combined with video booths [would] produce any criminal 
 
 163. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “We may posit that two adult stores next door to each 
other attract 100 patrons per day.  The two businesses split apart might attract 49 patrons each.  
(Two patrons, perhaps, will be discouraged by the inconvenience of the separation—a relatively 
small cost to speech.)” Alameda, 535 U.S. at 452.  Justice Kennedy continued, stating that 
“[d]epending on the economics of vice, 100 potential customers/victims might attract a coterie of 
thieves, prostitutes, and other ne’er-do-wells; yet 49 might attract none at all.”  Id.  If this was the 
case, “a dispersal ordinance would cause a great reduction in secondary effects at very small cost 
to speech.”  Id. 
 164. Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “The city could reach the reasonable conclusion 
that knocking down the wall between two adult businesses does not ameliorate any undesirable 
secondary effects of their proximity to one another.”  Id. 
 165. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 166. Id. at 465 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 458 (Souter, J., dissenting).  “In examining claims that there are causal 
relationships between adult businesses and an increase in secondary effects . . . , and between 
zoning and the mitigation of the effects, stress needs to be placed on the empirical character of the 
demonstration available.”  Id.  “The weaker the demonstration of facts distinct from disapproval 
of the ‘adult’ viewpoint, the greater the likelihood that nothing more than condemnation of the 
viewpoint drives the regulation.”  Id. 
 168. Alameda, 535 U.S. (Souter J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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effects.”170  Furthermore, the only evidence produced by the city was the study, 
which could not support the proposition because it drew “no general 
conclusion that individual stores spread apart from other adult 
establishments . . . [were] associated with any degree of criminal activity above 
the general norm.”171  Based on the study, the proper conclusion for Justice 
Souter was that splitting up the freestanding adult stores would “have no 
consequence for secondary effects whatever.”172 
Justice Souter bolstered his position by refuting the applicability of the 
studies used in Renton and Young.  He pointed to a ‘key distinction’ between 
the Los Angeles breakup requirement and the zoning ordinances at issue in the 
prior cases.  This difference was that “the zoning approved in those two cases 
had no effect on the way the owners of the stores carried on their adult 
businesses beyond controlling location.”173  Los Angeles, on the other hand, 
“no longer accept[ed] businesses as their owners choose to conduct them 
within their own four walls, but [barred] a video arcade in a bookstore, a 
combination shown by the record to be commercially natural, if not 
universal.”174  Thus, Justice Souter concluded the ordinance lacked “any 
demonstrable connection to the interest in crime control” and imposed a 
heavier burden than that condoned by the Court in either Renton or Young.175 
B. Analysis 
1. Summary Judgment Requires Inferences Drawn in the City’s Favor 
The distinct aspects of Alameda, particularly its disposition as a summary 
judgment motion, solidify its holding.  When considering a motion for 
summary judgment, the Court must determine whether the record, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows any genuine issue of 
material fact.176  Both the plurality and Justice Kennedy appropriately 
concluded that because this case was only at the summary judgment stage, Los 
 
 170. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting).  The city has not “called the Court’s attention to any 
other empirical study, or even anecdotal police evidence, that supports the city’s assumption.”  Id.  
(Souter, J., dissenting).  The subsequent inference therefore, must be that “if the Los Angeles 
study sheds any light whatever on the city’s position, it is the light of skepticism, for [the Court] 
may fairly suspect that the study said nothing about the secondary effects of freestanding stores 
because no effects were observed.”  Alameda, 535 U.S. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 465 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Furthermore, “no heavier burden than the location 
limit was approved by this Court.”  Id. 
 174. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 175. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 465 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 176. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).  See also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). 
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Angeles’ zoning regulation on adult businesses should not be struck down.177  
Justice Souter, for the dissent, nonetheless disagreed, stating that Los Angeles 
had failed to meet its evidentiary burden.178  The reasoning behind these 
conclusions will be discussed infra. 
2. Deference to the City Makes the Presumption of Pretext 
Inappropriate. 
Substantial deference should be paid to the city of Los Angeles not only 
because it opposed the summary judgment motion brought by the adult 
businesses, but also because it was attempting to remedy a serious situation on 
its city streets.179  As noted in Young and adopted by the Court in Renton, a 
city’s “interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that 
must be accorded high respect.”180  Both the plurality of Alameda and Justice 
Kennedy agreed that a city “is in a better position than the Judiciary to gather 
and evaluate data on local problems.”181  Los Angeles conducted its own study 
in 1977 to assess how adult establishments impacted their surrounding 
neighborhoods and found a correlation between concentrations of adult 
businesses and an increase in crime.182  Relying on this study, Los Angeles 
amended its zoning ordinance to prevent the congregation of adult businesses 
in a single building.183  This amendment to its zoning ordinance was a clear 
attempt by the city to preserve the quality of Los Angeles neighborhoods.  
Under Renton, the city’s choice should be respected.184 
While deferring to a particular city’s judgment on resolving local 
problems, the plurality also noted that when First Amendment rights are at 
 
 177. Justice O’Connor, for the plurality, concluded that “the city, at this stage of the litigation, 
ha[d] complied with the evidentiary requirement in Renton.”  Alameda, 535 U.S. at 439.  In 
Justice Kennedy’s view, Los Angeles should be allowed to impose regulations on adult 
businesses under its zoning authority, at least to the extent that it not be foreclosed by summary 
judgment.  Id. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 178. Id. at 466 n. 9 (Souter, J., dissenting).  “The plurality seems to ask us to shut our eyes to 
the city’s failings by emphasizing that this case is merely at the stage of summary judgment, but 
ignores the fact that at this summary judgment stage the city has made it plain that it relies on no 
evidence beyond the 1977 study, which provides no support for the city’s action.”  Id. 
 179. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 180. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (quoting Young, 427 
U.S. at 71). 
 181. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 440 (plurality opinion).  Justice Kennedy expressly stated that the 
“Los Angeles City Council [knew] the streets of Los Angeles better than [the Court did.]”  Id. at 
451-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Further, when the inferences drawn by the city appear to be 
reasonable, the Court should not say the conclusion is baseless.  Id. at 452. 
 182. Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 183. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 431. 
 184. Id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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issue, it must still exercise independent judgment.185  The failure to follow 
through on this second step and “address how speech will fare under the city’s 
ordinance” was, in Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the plurality’s downfall.186  
Turning to zoning ordinances in general, Justice Kennedy asserted that they 
“have a prima facie legitimate purpose: to limit the negative externalities of 
land use.”187 
The dissent in Alameda was primarily worried about the use of secondary 
effects as a pretext for suppressing speech through zoning ordinances.188  As 
Justice Kennedy eloquently put it however, “the ordinance may be a covert 
attack on speech, but [the Court] should not presume it to be so.”  Justice 
Kennedy’s position is supported by Young and Renton. 
In Young, the plurality concluded that the zoning ordinance restricting the 
location of adult movie theaters in an attempt to prevent negative secondary 
effects was constitutional.189  The plurality expressly noted that what 
ultimately was at stake was “nothing more than a limitation on the place where 
adult films may be exhibited.”190  Justice Powell, who concurred in Young, 
continued along the same line, stating that if the city “had been concerned with 
restricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to close 
them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice as to 
location.”191  Thus, the plurality and concurring opinions in Young, agreed that 
the zoning ordinance, which restricted available locations for adult businesses 
to operate, should not be presumed to have illicit motives. 
The Court in Renton also addressed the issue of pretext and specifically 
stated, “it is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not 
strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit 
legislative motive.”192  The Court’s finding that the city’s predominate intent in 
 
 185. Id. at 440.  Thus, the “deference to the evidence presented by the city of Los Angeles is 
the product of a careful balance between competing interests.”  Id. 
 186. Id. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  While “the material inside adult bookstores and 
movie theaters is speech, the consequent sordidness outside is not.  The challenge is to correct the 
latter while leaving the former, as far as possible, untouched.”  Alameda, 535 U.S. at 445 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 187. Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 188. Id. at 458 (Souter, J., dissenting).  “The weaker the demonstration of facts distinct from 
disapproval of the ‘adult’ viewpoint, the greater the likelihood that nothing more than 
condemnation of the viewpoint drives the regulation.”  Id. 
 189. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976). 
 190. Young, 427 U.S. at 72-73.  The plurality went on to comment that the “situation would 
be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, 
lawful speech.”  Id. at 73 n.35. 
 191. Id. at 82 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 192. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting United States 
v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)).  “The decisions of this [C]ourt from the beginning lend no 
support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power 
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regulating adult businesses was to control secondary effects was “more than 
adequate to establish that the city’s pursuit of its zoning interests here [were] 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”193  Therefore, even if the 
legislature had a hidden agenda, Renton showed that the Court would not 
automatically strike down the statute on such a basis. 
Coupling this idea of lack of pretext with that of deference to the 
municipalities leads to the conclusion that Justice Kennedy was correct in 
stating the secondary effects rationale of a city’s zoning ordinance should not 
be presumed to be an attempt to suppress speech.  The plurality in Young and 
the Court in Renton were both faced with locational zoning ordinances 
intended to alleviate the negative secondary effects associated with adult 
businesses in their respective cities.  Both gave substantial deference to the 
cities and did not give credit to the argument that the secondary effects 
rationale was simply a pretext for suppression of speech.  Because the 
ordinance in Alameda was closely related to the time, place, manner 
restrictions at issue in Young and Renton, it was not, as believed to be by the 
dissent, an attempt to suppress free speech or regulate how adult establishment 
owners should run their businesses. 
3. The Evidentiary Burden to be Overcome by the City is Slight. 
When a city asserts a secondary effects rationale for its zoning ordinance, 
the Court should give deference to the city’s justification.  But according to 
Justice Kennedy, it should also assess the extent of intrusion the zoning 
regulation would have on the adult entertainment business.194  Justice 
Kennedy’s argument gains support from one commentator who asserted, 
“where the limitations on speech under [zoning] regulations are considered 
merely incidental to the necessary regulation of the target conduct, they pass 
constitutional muster.”195  Similarly, the Court in United States v. O’Brien 
noted that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same 
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating 
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
 
on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.”  
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)).  The Court 
further noted that inquiring into the purposes or motives behind the enactment of certain statutes 
was a “hazardous matter.”  Id.  “What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is 
not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for 
[the Court] to eschew guesswork.”  Id. 
 193. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48. 
 194. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 450 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 195. Jerrold J. Kippen, Sexually Explicit Speech, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 799, 800 (2001). 
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freedoms.”196  The appropriate time to address the limitations upon speech 
caused by a zoning ordinance, as determined under the plurality’s balancing 
test, is after the adult business succeeds in casting doubt on the validity of the 
city’s justification.  The validity of this test is the next issue to resolve. 
The so-called balancing test used by the Alameda plurality, to determine 
whether there was sufficient evidence to show a zoning regulation was 
designed to serve a significant government interest, was hinted at in Pap’s 
A.M.197  The plurality there first noted that the city council members were the 
ones likely to have had firsthand knowledge “of what took place at and around 
nude dancing establishments in Erie, and [could] make particularized, expert 
judgments about the resulting harmful secondary effects.”198  It then continued 
by stating that the establishment “had ample opportunity to contest the 
council’s findings about secondary effects,” but had “never challenged that city 
council’s findings or cast any specific doubt on the validity of those 
findings.”199  The plurality of Pap’s A.M. then concluded that in “the absence 
of any reason to doubt it, the city’s expert judgment should be credited.”200 
Guided by the plurality in Pap’s A.M., Alameda’s plurality was right to 
conclude that Los Angeles’ zoning ordinance was sufficiently justified by 
secondary effects.  The primary downfall for the adult businesses in Alameda 
was their lack of proof, which called the secondary effects rationale into 
question.201  Although they had the opportunity to show that the rationale was 
faulty, they did not cast any doubt on the city’s findings but simply complained 
 
 196. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.  Furthermore, the Court will not “foreclose consideration of 
First Amendment claims in those rare instances when an ‘incidental’ restriction upon 
expression . . . has the effect of entirely preventing a ‘speaker’ from reaching a significant 
audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate.”  Id. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 197. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 298 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 198. Id. at 297-98.  Following up on this principle, the Court has, on another occasion, noted 
that prior case law did not “require that empirical data come to [the Court] accompanied by a 
surfeit of background information.”  Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995). 
To the contrary, litigants have been permitted “to justify speech restrictions by reference to 
studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether.”  Id. at 628 (citing Renton, 475 
U.S. at 50-51; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)).  Litigants were also 
allowed to justify regulations by “simple common sense” in some circumstances.  Id. (citing 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)).  Even when applying the higher standard of strict 
scrutiny, the litigant was allowed “to justify restriction based solely on history, consensus, and 
‘simple common sense.’”  Id. 
 199. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 298. 
 200. Id.  After all, the ordinance was content neutral, and the “government should have 
sufficient leeway to justify such a law based on secondary effects.”  Id. 
 201. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002) (plurality 
opinion).  The plurality concluded the city had complied with its evidentiary requirements, and 
the adult businesses merely supported their summary judgment motion with complaints the city’s 
study failed to prove the secondary effects justification was correct.  Alameda, 535 U.S. at 439. 
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the study was deficient.  In effect, the adult businesses asked the city to 
produce additional evidence while they failed to reciprocate by providing any 
reason to question the rationale.  As aptly displayed in Pap’s A.M., because 
there was no reason to doubt the city’s justification for its ordinance, Los 
Angeles’ choice to regulate adult businesses should be respected. 
4. Cities Need Not Conduct Business Specific Studies. 
The dissent in Alameda stressed that the city’s study, which allegedly 
supported the city’s zoning ordinance, did not in fact, provide such support.202  
The city’s primary error was that it failed to show a connection between 
isolated adult establishments and the negative secondary effects they allegedly 
produced.203  The plurality in Alameda responded to the dissent’s contention, 
stating that Justice Souter “ask[ed] the city to demonstrate, not merely by 
appeal to common sense, but also with empirical data, that its ordinance will 
successfully lower crime.”204  The plurality in Pap’s A.M. did not require such 
a substantial showing. 
In Pap’s A.M., the city relied on a study that dealt with different subject 
matter than did the ordinance before it.205  The plurality in Pap’s A.M. noted 
that nude dancing was “of the same character as the adult entertainment at 
issue in Renton [and] Young.”206  Thus, “it was reasonable for Erie to conclude 
that such nude dancing was likely to produce the same secondary effects.”207  
Similarly, the study in Alameda found a correlation between concentrations of 
adult establishments and secondary effects, although it did not specifically 
study isolated establishments.  It is logical that if the city of Erie was allowed 
to “reasonably rely on the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton and 
 
 202. Id. at 462 (Souter, J., dissenting).  “If the Los Angeles study sheds any light whatever on 
the city’s position, it is the light of skepticism, for [the Court] may fairly suspect that the study 
said nothing about the secondary effects of freestanding stores because no effects were observed.”  
Id. 
 203. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).  “The Los Angeles study treats such combined stores as one 
and draws no general conclusion that individual stores spread apart from other adult 
establishments are associated with any degree of criminal activity above the general norm.”  Id. at 
462 (citations omitted). 
 204. Id. at 439. 
 205. In Pap’s A.M., the city enacted an ordinance banning public nudity.  Pap’s A.M., 529 
U.S. at 283.  Consequently, nude dancers were required to wear, “at a minimum, pasties and a ‘G-
string.’”  Id. at 284.  Support for its ordinance was found in the decisions of Renton and Young, 
which dealt with zoning regulations of adult motion picture theaters.  See id. at 296-97. 
 206. Id. at 296-97. 
 207. Id. at 297.  The plurality concluded that Erie could “reasonably rely on the evidentiary 
foundation set forth in Renton and [Young] to the effect that secondary effects are caused by the 
presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a given neighborhood.”  Pap’s A.M., 
529 U.S. at 297. 
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[Young,]”208 Los Angeles may reasonably rely on its own 1977 study.  Justice 
Kennedy was therefore correct in stating the city may “infer—from its study 
and from its own experience—that two adult businesses under the same roof 
are no better than two next door.”209  This inference is sufficient to show the 
city’s zoning ordinance was designed to serve the city’s interest in avoiding the 
secondary effects associated with adult businesses. 
As shown, it is apparent that the plurality and concurring opinions in 
Alameda are sound.  The city of Los Angeles produced enough evidence at this 
stage in the litigation to meet the requirements outlined in Renton.  The 
plurality and Justice Kennedy rightly paid substantial deference to the city’s 
findings in its 1977 study of adult businesses and secondary effects.  Because 
the adult business did not produce evidence challenging the city’s rationale, the 
city was not required to present more evidence than its study.  Finally, its study 
alone was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the city’s zoning 
ordinance was designed to serve its interest in combating negative secondary 
effects. 
C. Lower Court Interpretations of Alameda 
In order to assess the impact of Alameda, subsequent cases prove to be the 
most insightful.  A major obstacle for Alameda was that it only achieved 
plurality status.  One court aptly commented that the plurality status of a 
decision may prove to be a disadvantage.210  Specifically, it mentioned that 
“Alameda Books is difficult to apply, because no single opinion garnered the 
votes of a majority of Justices.”211  This consideration is significant when 
attempting to understand the lower court decisions issued after Alameda and 
also provides a rationale for their apparent lack of uniformity. 
1. The Fifth Circuit Reveals Discrepancies. 
Some circuit courts, including the Fifth, have used the plurality opinion in 
Alameda as the appropriate authority.  For example, the respondents in Baby 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  “The city could reach the 
reasonable conclusion that knocking down the wall between two adult businesses does not 
ameliorate any undesirable secondary effects of their proximity to one another.”  Id. 
 210. Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 310 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2002).  “When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”  Id. at 819 (quoting Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quotations omitted)).  Once an area of agreement has been 
discovered “between ‘at least five justices,’ that conclusion is valid as law even if some of the 
Justices endorsing the proposition in question were in dissent.”  Id. (quoting Snead v. Redland 
Aggregates Ltd., 998 F.2d 1325, 1333 n.10 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 211. Id. at 818. 
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Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. City of Dallas212 argued the zoning ordinance at 
issue was not designed to serve the government’s interest in controlling 
secondary effects.213  Evidence relied upon by the city in enacting its ordinance 
included studies, public hearings, comment-taking, and town hall meetings 
regarding the negative secondary effects produced by sexually-oriented 
businesses.214  Respondents specifically claimed that the evidence produced 
did not indicate that the “requirement that all dancers wear bikini tops instead 
of pasties [would] reduce deleterious secondary effects.”215  The court in Baby 
Dolls responded that a city was not required to demonstrate with empirical data 
that its ordinance would successfully lower crime, at least “not without actual 
and convincing evidence from plaintiffs to the contrary.”216 
The Fifth Circuit decided “it was reasonable for the [c]ity to conclude that 
establishments featuring performers in attire more revealing than bikini tops 
pose the same types of problems associated with other [sexual oriented 
businesses.]217  This decision by the Fifth Circuit was correctly decided along 
the same lines as was Alameda.  Because it was reasonable for the city of Erie 
in Pap’s A.M. to infer nude dancing would produce the same negative effects 
as adult theaters, it was reasonable for the Fifth Circuit to conclude that 
businesses allowing their performers to wear less clothing than bikini tops 
would as well.  Therefore, as in Alameda, the court in Baby Dolls rightly 
concluded that the zoning ordinance that regulated adult businesses was 
designed to serve a substantial government interest.218 
Shortly after the decision in Baby Dolls was issued, the Fifth Circuit 
decided Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio.219  The ordinance at issue 
in Encore forbade “sexually oriented businesses from locating within 1000 feet 
of residential areas.”220  As in Renton, the city in Encore relied on studies 
produced by other cities that focused on secondary effects of adult businesses 
in general.221  Unlike Renton however, the Fifth Circuit required the city to 
 
 212. 295 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 213. Baby Dolls, 295 F.3d at 481.  Respondents maintained “that the evidence the City relied 
upon [was] irrelevant to the Ordinance.”  Id.  The ordinance imposed a locational restriction on 
sexually—oriented businesses.  Id. at 474.  To avoid being classified as a sexually—oriented 
business, dancers at the adult establishments were effectively required to wear no less than bikini 
tops.  See id. at 476. 
 214. Id. at 480. 
 215. Baby Dolls, 295 F.3d at 481. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 482. 
 218. See id. at 482. 
 219. 310 F.3d 812 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 220. Encore, 310 F.3d at 814.  Encore Videos, a business that provided only sales for off-
premises viewing, brought suit. 
 221. Id. at 821. 
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produce more evidence than the studies, and its failure to do so prompted the 
court to strike down the zoning ordinance.222 
The court in Encore emphasized an apparent agreement between Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Alameda and the dissenting opinion written 
by Justice Souter.223  “Justice Kennedy and the dissenters therefore agree that 
the city at least must provide evidence that the burden on speech imposed by 
an ordinance is ‘no greater than necessary to further [the city’s] interest’ in 
combating secondary effects.”224  The Encore court then stated that for this city 
to meet its burden under Alameda, it “must provide at least some evidence of 
secondary effects specific to adult businesses that sell books or videos solely 
for off-site entertainment.”225 
In defining the evidentiary burden held by the city, the Encore court 
overlooked the holdings of both Baby Dolls and Alameda.  The Court in 
Alameda held that the city of Los Angeles could reasonably rely on its study to 
support its zoning ordinance, at least at summary judgment stage.226  Contrary 
to this position, which specified no additional support was required, the Encore 
court declared that the city’s evidence was insufficient to link secondary 
effects to specific adult businesses and further proof was required.227  As 
shown in the above analysis, this requirement is clearly excessive, especially 
because the court in Encore was also decided on a summary judgment motion.  
Similarly, the conclusion in Encore directly conflicted with the prior Fifth 
Circuit decision in Baby Dolls.  Thus, in light of Alameda and Baby Dolls, the 
Encore court reached the wrong decision and should have allowed the city to 
reasonably infer from its studies that businesses exclusively selling videos for 
off-premise viewing would produce the same secondary effects as other adult 
businesses. 
2. The Sixth Circuit Grants Deference to a City’s Judgment. 
The District Court in Executive Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids228 
dealt with a challenge to a city zoning ordinance similar to that in Young, 
where an adult business could not be located within 500 feet of a residential 
 
 222. Id. at 822-23. 
 223. Id. at 819.  “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining 
the result enjoys the assent of five justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”  Id. 
at 819 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quotations omitted)). 
 224. Encore, 310 F.3d at 819 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 
425, 464 n.8 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)). 
 225. Id. at 822. 
 226. Alameda, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 227. Encore, 310 F.3d at 822. 
 228. 227 F. Supp. 2d 731 (W.D. Mich. 2002). 
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district or within 1000 feet of another adult business.229  Respondents argued 
that there was no showing that the city relied upon “anything more than 
speculation and unsupported conclusions” to justify its ordinance.230  Looking 
to the Alameda plurality opinion, the Executive Arts court noted that a city had 
“broad latitude in adopting solutions to secondary effects.”231  But, it also 
specified that the city must provide evidence showing a connection between 
adult businesses and secondary effects.232 
Looking to the record, the court in Executive Arts found the city had 
conducted meetings that discussed concerns about the “deleterious effects 
caused by adult-oriented businesses” as well as various methods to alleviate 
such concerns.233  It looked to the express purpose behind the ordinance234 and 
also noted it was “almost identical” to the ordinance in Young.235  Relying on 
the plurality in Alameda, the court in Executive Arts stated a city may rely on 
evidence it reasonably believed relevant to show a connection between 
secondary effects and adult businesses.236  It then appropriately concluded that 
the city adequately demonstrated such a connection and could prevail on this 
issue at the summary judgment stage.237 
3. The Seventh Circuit Emphasizes Effects on Speech Must be Assessed. 
While conflict between the plurality and concurring opinions in Alameda 
produced disputes over which rationale should be utilized, the Judicial Council 
of the Seventh Circuit resolved the discrepancy solely in favor of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence.  In Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset,238 the 
Judicial Council noted the differences between the plurality and concurring 
opinions in Alameda were quite subtle.239  Moreover, because “Justice 
 
 229. Executive Arts, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 734. 
 230. Id. at 743.  “In particular, [the adult business] argue[d] that the City ha[d] failed to show 
that the ordinance [was] based upon any evidence showing that there [was] a link between adult 
bookstores and adverse secondary effects.”  Id. 
 231. Id. at 742. 
 232. Id. at 742 (requiring the city to show a connection is not a demanding standard, 
however). 
 233. Executive Arts, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 743. 
 234. The purpose of this ordinance was “to address secondary effects caused by 
concentrations of specific businesses, particularly those engaged in the sale or display of 
sexually-explicit material.”  Id. at 744. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 742. 
 237. Id. at 744. 
 238. 316 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 239. Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 721.  “[W]hile Justice Kennedy believed that the plurality did not 
adequately address” the effect the city’s regulation would have on speech, “he agreed with the 
plurality’s overall conclusion that a municipality’s initial burden of demonstrating a substantial 
government interest in regulating the adverse secondary effects associated with adult 
entertainment [was] slight.”  Id. at 721-22. 
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Kennedy’s concurrence [was] the narrowest opinion joining the judgment of 
the Court in Alameda,” it should be considered the “controlling opinion.”240 
The ordinance at issue in Ben’s Bar prohibited the sale and consumption of 
alcohol on the premises of adult businesses.241  The Village Board, in enacting 
the ordinance, used judicial decisions, multiple studies from other cities, and 
reports to “support its conclusion that adult entertainment produce[d] adverse 
secondary effects.”242  Respondents in Ben’s Bar argued the city must conduct 
its own studies “to determine whether adverse secondary effects result when 
liquor is served on the premises of adult entertainment establishments.”243  
Citing Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Alameda, the Judicial Council quickly 
disposed of the claim, stating the respondent’s view had “been expressly (and 
repeatedly) rejected by the Supreme Court.”244 
The respondents in Ben’s Bar next contended that the city’s reports were 
faulty because they failed to relate specifically to the “effects of serving 
alcohol in establishments offering nude and semi-nude dancing.”245  Relying 
on the plurality opinion in Alameda, the Judicial Council for the Seventh 
Circuit found “it was entirely reasonable for the Village to conclude that 
barroom nude dancing was likely to produce adverse secondary effects at the 
local level, even in the absence of specific studies on the matter.”246  Based on 
the preceding analysis of Alameda, it is apparent the Judicial Council correctly 
resolved Ben’s Bar in holding the evidentiary record, without more, fairly 
supported the city’s secondary effects rationale.247 
4. The Eighth Circuit Proves the City’s Rationale is Sufficient. 
As in Alameda, the issue before the Eighth Circuit in SOB, Inc. v. County 
of Benton was whether there was “sufficient evidence of adverse secondary 
 
 240. Id. at 722. 
 241. Id. at 723. 
 242. Id. at 725. 
 243. Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 725. 
 244. Id.  To support this proposition, the Ben’s Bar court relies on the language from Renton 
that “the First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting an ordinance to conduct new 
studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as 
whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem the 
city addresses.”  Id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986); 
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 451-52 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 726.  The Judicial Council further stressed that “the Supreme Court has gone so far 
as to assert that ‘[c]ommon sense indicates that any form of nudity coupled with alcohol in a 
public place begets undesirable behavior.’”  Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 726 (quoting New York State 
Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981)). 
 247. Id. 
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effects to justify” the enactment of the county’s nude dancing regulation.248  
An adult business, featuring nude dancing, challenged the county’s ordinance, 
which effectively compelled the business’ dancers to wear pasties and G-
strings when performing.249  Before the ordinance was passed, the county 
gathered studies from other cities addressing the secondary effects associated 
with adult businesses and held a public hearing in which citizens showed their 
support for the ordinance.250  The adult business argued the evidence was 
insufficient to show the ordinance furthered the county’s interest in combating 
secondary effects because of contrary evidence that had been produced.251 
Although the SOB court relied on Alameda, the ordinance before it was a 
ban on nude dancing, and as such, the evidence required to support it was 
different than that necessary for the zoning regulation at issue in Alameda.252  
Notwithstanding this difference, the SOB court garnered support from Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Alameda to conclude “a ban on live nude 
dancing impose[d] a de minimis restriction on expressive conduct, while 
otherwise ‘leaving the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially 
intact.’”253  Granting deference to the county’s studies,254 the SOB court 
concluded that because the adult business “failed to cast sufficient doubt on the 
County’s rationale for the Ordinance, the ban on live nude dancing [was] 
constitutional.”255 
If SOB had dealt with a zoning ordinance, the Eighth Circuit might not 
have reached the same result.  Given its reliance on both the plurality and 
 
 248. 317 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 249. SOB, Inc., 317 F.3d at 859. 
 250. Id. at 862-63. 
 251. Id. at 863.  The evidence showed that the adult business “had neither caused higher 
crime rates nor depressed the value of nearby properties in the time [it] had been operating.”  Id.  
Additionally, the adult business “submitted an article criticizing the methodologies of the 
secondary effects studies relied upon by other municipalities.”  Id. (citing Bryant Paul, et al., 
Government Regulation of “Adult” Businesses Through Zoning and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: 
Dubunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL. 355 (2001)). 
 252. Id.  at 863.  The adult business brought forth evidence that “addressed only two adverse 
secondary effects, property values and crime in the vicinity of an adult entertainment 
establishment.”  SOB, Inc., 317 F.3d at 863.  Although these effects may be especially relevant to 
zoning regulations, a “ban on live nude dancing may address other adverse secondary effects, 
such as the likelihood that an [establishment’s] dancers and customers . . . will foster illegal 
activity such as drug use, prostitution, tax evasion, and fraud.”  Id. 
 253. Id. at 863 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. 535 U.S. 425, 449 
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 254. Id. at 863-64.  In reaching this conclusion, the court in SOB heavily relied on the 
plurality opinion from Pap’s A.M., which stated the city was not required to produce independent 
evidence as long as it reasonably believed it to be relevant.  Id. at 863 (citing City of Erie v. Pap’s 
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000)).  The SOB court also looked to both Alameda’s plurality opinion 
and concurrence to support its deferential outcome.  SOB, Inc., 317 F.3d at 863-64. 
 255. Id. at 864. 
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concurring opinions in Alameda256 and the presence of conflicting evidence 
relevant to the rationale behind a zoning ordinance,257 the county most likely 
would have had to produce additional evidence.258  As shown in the Alameda 
analysis however, because there was no conflicting evidence with respect to 
the rationale of the county’s nude dancing ban, the Eighth Circuit correctly 
decided that the county’s findings addressing secondary effects was sufficient. 
5. The Ninth Circuit Reaffirms the Reasonable Reliance Test. 
In the Ninth Circuit case, Deja Vu-Everett-Federal Way, Inc. v. City of 
Federal Way,259 the city amended its zoning ordinance that regulated adult 
businesses.260  The respondent argued that the city “had not shown that the 
then-existing zoning regulations had proven ineffective at curbing secondary 
effects of adult uses,”261 and “should be required to conduct its own study to 
show why the existing regulations need[ed] to be modified.”262  Responding to 
this argument, the Deja Vu court looked to Alameda.263  The Ninth Circuit 
quickly disposed of the respondent’s claim after finding that the “regulations 
were based on the studies, experiences, and police records of many cities.”264  
Therefore, the evidence relied upon by the city was reasonably relevant to the 
problem the city addressed265 and satisfied the standards outlined by 
Alameda’s plurality.266 
 
 256. See id. at 863-64. 
 257. The evidence produced by the adult business “addressed only two adverse secondary 
effects, property values and crime in the vicinity of an adult entertainment establishment.  These 
are issues particularly relevant to zoning.”  Id. at 863. 
 258. “If plaintiffs succeed in casting doubt on a municipality’s rationale” by “furnishing 
evidence that disputes the municipality’s factual findings,” the municipality would be left with 
the additional burden of “supplement[ing] the record with evidence renewing support for a theory 
that justifies its ordinance.”  Alameda, 535 U.S. at 439 (plurality opinion). 
 259. 46 Fed.Appx. 409 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 260. Deja Vu, 46 Fed.Appx. at 410.  In effect, the zoning ordinance would require the adult 
business to “shut down, change, or move its operation.”  Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 410-11.  “The City of Los Angeles was allowed to modify existing regulations by 
relying on the same study on which the city relied when enacting the original regulations.”  Deja 
Vu, 46 Fed.Appx. at 410-11. 
 264. Id. at 411. 
 265. Id. 
 266. “A municipality may rely on any evidence that is ‘reasonably believed to be relevant’ for 
demonstrating a connection between speech and a substantial, independent government interest.”  
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (citing City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)).  It was reasonable for the city of Federal 
Way to rely on studies produced by other cities because Renton held a city was not required to 
conduct its own studies or produce independent evidence.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 51. 
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The respondent in Deja Vu further argued that the city failed to pass the 
test Justice Kennedy developed in his Alameda concurrence.  Under this 
alleged test, the city must advance “some basis to show that its regulation ha[d] 
the purpose of suppressing secondary effects, while leaving the quantity and 
accessibility of speech substantially intact.”267  The Deja Vu court also quickly 
rejected this argument by stating the city had “satisfied Justice Kennedy’s 
‘test,’ as well as that of the plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor.”268 
Although the Ninth Circuit seemed to endorse two different evidentiary 
standards for zoning ordinances, its reasoning is sound.  The evidence 
presented in this case was composed of studies, experiences, and police reports 
while the evidence offered in Alameda was the city’s own study.  The holding 
in Alameda was achieved with the help of Justice Kennedy, who concluded it 
was reasonable for the city of Los Angeles to rely on its study to show a 
connection between adult businesses and secondary effects.269  Accordingly, it 
was appropriate for the Ninth Circuit in Deja Vu to conclude the city could 
reasonably rely on the evidence it already produced and was not required to 
produce additional evidence. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
As shown, courts must balance competing interests when asked to rule on 
the validity of a city’s zoning ordinance regulating adult entertainment 
businesses.  The circuit court opinions before Alameda, although relying on 
Supreme Court precedent, displayed confusion about the evidentiary 
requirement that must be satisfied for a city to prove that its ordinance was 
designed to serve a substantial government interest.  Both the plurality opinion 
in Alameda and that of Justice Kennedy provided appropriate instruction for 
the lower courts to follow when presented with similar regulations.  
Consequently, the decisions issued after Alameda reveal a general acceptance 
of both rationales.  Therefore, a combination of rationales taken from both the 
plurality and concurring opinions, which provide standards for judging 
whether a city’s zoning ordinance was designed to serve its interests, should be 
followed. 
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